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Today, constitutional review by courts lies at the heart of liberal constitutional systems. This state 
of affairs reflects the rise of legal constitutionalism over political constitutionalism, and the 
judicialisation of politics.1 In many countries, courts play a significant role in gatekeeping the 
constitutionality of laws, thus upholding the hierarchy of norms. Some countries maintain separate 
constitutional courts whereas others rely on supreme courts or operate a decentralised form of 
review.2 In any case, monitoring (controlling) the constitutionality of laws seems to be mostly a task 
for judicial organs. Even such a system as that in the United Kingdom, with its uncodified 
constitution lacking a clear hierarchy of norms, now has a superior court that performs de facto 
judicial review.3  
Against the backdrop of liberal constitutionalism, the Nordic countries seem to stand out because 
the courts there play but a modest role in ensuring the constitutionality of laws, except in Norway 
where judicial review is rooted in the system.4 Of the Nordic systems, Finland stands out because of 
its deeply embedded system of a parliament-focused preventive model of constitutionality control 
that keeps the courts in a minor role even though the constitution allows judicial review.5 
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Parliament’s important role in constitutionality control is not unheard of because lack of 
constitutional judicial review is typical of the British-Scandinavian family of constitutional 
traditions.6 However, even in this family the Finnish model stands out because of the institutional 
manner in which it organises constitutionality control of parliamentary laws. In a comparative view, 
the Finnish system looks peculiar, which may give rise to misunderstandings as to how Finnish 
constitutionalism works. From a reading of the text of the Constitution Act (2000), it is impossible 
to grasp how central a constitutional role the Constitutional Law Committee plays based on 
customary constitutional law.7 Constitutional customs remain opaque to the outside observer and 
behind a language barrier in that not all official texts are translated into English or indeed any other 
major language.8 
 
In a comparative context, the Finnish system is interesting because it seemingly places 
parliamentarians, as committee members, in such a special place while constraining courts in a 
minor role. This goes against the worldwide current of legal constitutionalism and the growing 
power of judicial organs.9 Among European countries Finland is, however, not completely alone in 
choosing this way as the Netherlands example shows, although Finland has no formal ban on 
constitutional judicial review which is the case in Netherlands.10 Because Finland is a member of 
the European Union (since 1995) and has ratified the European Convention on Human Rights 
(1990), it may be instinctive to expect stronger judicial review ‒ and the reverse for politicians 
playing such an apparently significant role in terms of ensuring the constitutionality of laws.11 A 
general trend for decades has been the spread of judicial review-centred legal constitutionalism 
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across the globe so that today it is regarded as a part of democracy itself.12 Notwithstanding, 
Finland does well in the international democracy rankings and its judicial institutions are 
independent from the executive.13 Hence, a paradox is present: a democratic liberal system of 
government that still relies on political constitutionalism and shies away from constitutional judicial 
review.14 
 
This article argues that an understanding of the Finnish system of monitoring constitutionality 
requires an examination of the historical layers of Finland’s constitutional system.15 In general, the 
idea is simply that past events influence future events.16 The thrust of this article is that we can 
distinguish historical events that are locked in, amounting to a non-judicial form of constitutionality 
control. Even though this point is made on the basis of the Finnish case, it may possess a validity 
that is more general. It will be shown that certain constitutional choices were locked in at certain 
historical points so that they had significant implications in terms of how the system came to be as 
it is today. The article explains how political and legal constitutionalism can develop together in an 
interactive relationship in which the political and the legal are intertwined. With that in mind, the 
article not only explores the Finnish system but also highlights the relationship between the political 
and the legal, and how basic choices become locked in so that institutional arrangements change 
less than might be expected even when statutory law changes.  
 
Further, the article argues that path dependence is a phenomenon that shows how past events 
matter, so that an individual system of governance acquires the tenacity to go against global trends 
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to remain at least partially idiosyncratic.17 Nevertheless, it is important to go beyond the simple 
notion that ‘history matters’. The role of constitutional history, that is, the historical path of a 
constitution as a broader body of constitutional rules, is essential because it demonstrates how 
institutional patterns can become locked in, hence making it very difficult to abolish or change these 
patterns later.18 This, in turn, demonstrates the strength of both legal and political culture for a 
system that evolves gradually without drastic internal changes. 
The article is structured under five headings. The first concerns the revolution of 1772 and how it 
locked in certain institutional patterns, which became important in the 1800s. The second section 
explains the institutional set-up for Finnish constitutionality control, at the same time providing the 
backbone for the historical analysis that follows, bringing to light the parallels between past and 
present. Thereafter, Finland’s annexation by Russia is addressed, together with how the Swedish 
constitutional tradition was preserved so that the focus is on the layered continuity of a core 
constitutional modus operandi. This leads to the birth of constitutionality control as a part of 
Finland’s autonomy-defending politics of the late 1800s. This section also addresses constitutional 
reforms in the early 1900s. Last in the spotlight is how parliamentary-focused constitutionality 
control took root in an independent Finland from 1917 onwards. The concluding discussion restates 
the main argument and addresses the significance of path dependence for the future of the Finnish 
system of constitutionality control. 
 
<H1>Institutional set-up for constitutionality control 
Finland’s constitutional culture is close to the other Nordic systems, all of which employ 
mechanisms for reviewing the constitutionality of legislation.19 Accordingly, these systems 
presuppose some form of separation of powers, distinguishing especially between the legislature 
and the judiciary, and formal hierarchy of norms. Nevertheless, different constitutional 
arrangements determine how judicial review of legislation is organised.20 Denmark does not have 
an explicit constitutional provision covering judicial review. However, it hesitantly recognises 
judicial review as a part of its system. Finland and Sweden have explicit written constitutional 
provisions concerning judicial review, although in practice judicial review is resorted to cautiously. 
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Norway formally added judicial review by an amendment to its Constitution Act in 2014, although 
judicial review has long been a part of the Norwegian system. Iceland also allows judicial review, 
which it regards as a non-problematic element of the constitutional system.21 In a comparative 
Nordic view, the most distinctive feature of the Finnish system is the modus operandi in which it 
monitors the constitutionality of statutory laws enacted by the parliament.  
 
Finland, like other Nordic systems, maintains no constitutional court but all courts are allowed to 
perform judicial review of legislation to a certain limited extent. After the total reform of the 
Constitution Act in 2000, it became possible for courts to perform judicial review of legislation.22 
The notion of monitoring constitutionality, however, is not limited to judicial review because, in 
addition to the courts, other public authorities are also obliged to interpret legislation in adherence 
to the Constitution and to respect constitutional and human rights.23 According to the Constitution 
Act (Article 106), the courts, when deciding a case, must give preference to the Constitution if 
applying a parliamentary Act would manifestly conflict (ilmeinen ristiriita) with the Constitution 
Act. In a handful of cases, starting from 2004, the courts have applied Article 106. However, in the 
overall picture judicial review by the courts plays a minor role in terms of safeguarding the 
constitutionality of parliamentary Acts.24  
 
In practice, the constitutionality of laws is examined in advance, that is, even before an act enters 
into force. Review mainly takes place in the parliament’s influential Constitutional Law Committee 
(perustuslakivaliokunta). The key function of this parliamentary-bound control is advance 
prevention of laws that conflict with the Constitution being enacted in the ordinary legislative 
procedure. From the constitutional point of view, the Committee’s key function is to issue 
statements on Bills sent to it for consideration (not all Bills undergo Committee review) and on the 
constitutionality of other legislative matters and their bearing on international human rights.25 While 
the Committee members are ordinary members of the parliament, the Committee calls experts 
(based on constitutional convention, explained further below) to give evidence, and the Committee 
itself operates in a non-party-political manner in reporting to the parliament. These experts are 
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external and, in practice, they are mostly law professors specialising in constitutional law or more 
generally in public law.26 The Committee’s reports are legally grounded written formal statements 
and are respected by the government, which must seek to amend the provisions of a Bill that the 
Committee has found to be unconstitutional before the Bill can be passed. If the unconstitutionality 
is significant it means, in practice, that the Bill is withdrawn and the government has to think of 
another way to proceed because in the Finnish multiparty system governments do not have the 
required qualified majority to change the Constitution Act.27  
 
From a comparative point of view the fact that the Constitutional Committee functions in a non-
political quasi-judicial manner (statements are based on the evidence given by external 
constitutional experts; the Committee follows its own ‘precedents’; there is no party-political 
discipline) is significant. All this results in a system of controlling the constitutionality of 
legislation, a system which combines an abstract ex ante and concrete case-bound review 
mechanism. Importantly, the significance of the perustuslakivaliokunta is reflected in the whole 
legal system and its statements hold a special status as a source of law as de facto precedents.28 
Only with slight exaggeration, one may characterise the weight of these statements as de facto 
‘constitutional precedents’. Importantly, the Committee does not say anything about the actual 
content of a Bill because its only concerns are constitutionality issues. In this respect, the 
Committee is different from all the other parliamentary committees that concentrate on the 
substantive issues of Bills and where members follow party discipline. 
 
Overall, the constitutionality control system may be described as an institutional arrangement that 
combines a constitutional tradition of legislative supremacy and the notion of democracy as 
majority rule with a more recent tendency to practise rights-based judicial review of parliamentary 
legislation that arises from the national constitution and European commitments.29  
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<H1>Locking in autocracy 
In order to understand how the current constitutionality control of laws came to be, we must look 
back at those pivotal moments when essential institutional factors were born and key occurrences 
took place. In this case, the first lock-in moment took place in the late eighteenth century, when 
absolute monarchy was established by Gustav III (who ruled 1771-1792), diminishing the power of 
the Diet of the Estates and resulting in the end of the Age of Liberty with the introduction of the 
Swedish Constitution of 1772. 
 
Swedish and Finnish history are necessarily intertwined because Finland formed the eastern part of 
Sweden from about 1200 to 1809. Sweden itself became a state during the rule of Gustav Vasa 
(1523-1560), who organised the state in the form of a hereditary monarchy.30 Later, in the 
seventeenth century, the Estates were able to compel the King to recognise the competency of the 
Diet of the Estates (Svea rikes ständer) to take part in legislating by convening from time to time. 
The first genuinely constitutional document came about in 1634 when the Form of Government 
(1634 års regeringsform) was adopted.31 This constitution limited the powers of the monarch for 
the following decades.32 In essence, the monarch could not rule alone as an absolute monarch, but 
had to act together with his council (med råds råde, meaning ‘with the council’s advice’), and also 
had to take advice from the Estates in matters concerning taxation.33 
 
The turn of events in the early eighteenth century did not mean a radical change, in that 
constitutional continuity from the previous century was surprisingly unbroken. Importantly, the 
1723 Form of Government (1723 års regeringsform) once again limited the powers of the monarch 
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and required the monarch to comply with common decisions of the Diet of the Estates.34 In other 
words, power shifted further from the King to the Estates. The period from 1719 to 1772 has been 
called the Age of Liberty (frihetstiden).35 However, this early form of constitutional monarchy did 
not root deeply because of what happened in 1772, the year when the path-dependent relevant lock-
in took place. At first, though, the powers of the monarch were not reinstated during the years 1719-
1723 when a new constitutional document was adopted.36 Later, this state of affairs was to change 
drastically. 
 
The harsh winds of constitutional backsliding blew strongly in the last decades of the eighteenth 
century. The Age of Liberty ended suddenly in 1772 when Gustav III turned back the constitutional 
clock by reasserting royal power over the Diet. His coup, although containing a military threat, was 
bloodless but at the same time meant a significant shift in the power structure of governance. Even 
though the Constitution of 1772 was, in part, also inspired by the Enlightenment and the ideas of 
Montesquieu, in practice it meant a strong monarchy and a weak Riksdag.37 Essentially, the King 
governed the state machinery and the Riksdag was assembled only at the monarch’s will in cases 
when taxes were to be raised or new legislation was to be passed. During the Age of Liberty, the 
King could be described as relatively powerless because the Estates were clearly more powerful 
than the monarch. This all changed with the coup by Gustav III.38 In short, the Age of Liberty of the 
Estates was over. 
 
Both the King and the Estates swore that the country would go back to autocracy, which the 1772 
Form of Government in fact reinstated.39 In a nutshell: the Estates more or less voluntarily accepted 
the new Form of Government without changes.40 The new constitutional document stipulated that 
the King was unable to make new laws or repeal old ones without the consent of the Diet, and that 
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the Diet was unable to do the same without the King’s consent.41 However, because the Riksdag 
would convene only on the King’s call, in reality this meant that the monarch could rule with lower-
ranking decrees and by simply using political influence based on the monarch’s ruling position. 
Later, the Deed of Association and Security (Förenings- och säkerhetsakten 1789) further 
strengthened the autocratic features of the system of government. The normative baseline of the 
Deed was clear: the King ‘possesses full power to govern’ and matters having to do with ruling are 
to be taken care of ‘in the manner the King sees useful’.42 This constitutional document added new 
provisions to the 1772 Form of Government, thus creating a system of two constitutional 
documents. In practice, the Deed further strengthened the King’s constitutional centrality while 
simultaneously seeking to further decrease the power of the aristocracy. This constitutionalised 
autocracy was literally ‘the rule of one’ (envälde) and was directly opposed to the idea of ‘the rule 
of many’ (pluralitetsvälde).43 Significantly, the Estates other than the nobility did not oppose the 
King’s constitutional reform because it was beneficial for them, leaving the nobility dissatisfied 
with the monarch ‒ and behind his later assassination.44 
 
For Finland, the lock-in of the Swedish system of autocratic governance is evident in the fact that 
both constitutional documents of this period ‒ the 1772 Form of Government and the 1789 Deed of 
Association and Security ‒ remained formally in force in Finland until 1919. Every previous 
embryonic Finnish plan to pass a new Form of Government before 1919 was blocked because of 
reluctance on the part of Russia, of whose empire Finland formed part from 1809.45 In other words, 
these new documents formed the constitutional foundation of the Grand Duchy when Finland was 
part of the Russian Empire. The fact that Finland was made a constitutional autocracy in 1772 
turned out to be decisive, in the sense of path dependence, for what was to follow. 
 
<H1>Grand Duchy of Finland 
Due to Gustav III’s coup, Finland’s constitutional system, comparatively speaking, lagged behind 
developments elsewhere in Western Europe. With revolutionary ideas neither current nor relevant, 
the result was that revolutionary constitutionalism was absent. After the Finnish war (1808-1809) 
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between Sweden and Russia, the eastern part of the realm was established as the new autonomous 
Grand Duchy of Finland within the Russian Empire. In hindsight, it is surprising how little actually 
changed even though the Russian governance model clearly differed from the Swedish one.46  
 
After the war, the new situation required constitutional re-organisation due to the fact that 600 years 
with Sweden was over. The Russian Tsar Alexander I (who ruled 1801-1825) called the 
representatives of the Estates to convene in the town of Porvoo. At the Diet of Porvoo – actually 
called the Landtag, i.e. not the Riksdag – the Estates acknowledged the change in governmental 
power and took an oath of allegiance.47 The Estates promised loyalty to their new monarch who, in 
turn, declared that he would leave inherited Swedish rules in force. This was a kind of backward 
medieval-style occurrence, in which the Estates made a dominion pact with the sovereign ruler. In 
the Act of Porvoo, the former eastern part of the Swedish realm became transformed into the Grand 
Duchy of Finland and Alexander I became the Grand Duke of Finland.48 In effect, Finland became 
an autonomous part of Imperial Russia. Importantly, Finns came to regard the Act of Porvoo as a 
pledge according to which Finland would be governed according to its existing laws.49 This 
interpretation was somewhat legalistic and fitted well with Finnish views, although it is not really 
clear what the Tsar actually meant when he promised to uphold the privileges of the Estates and 
existing fundamental laws.50  
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Talvio (eds.), Monetary Boundaries in Transition. A North European Economic History and the Finnish War 
1808–1809 (Museum of National Antiquities Stockholm 2010) p. 9. 
49 The whole pledge was actually broader and covered more than fundamental laws, i.e. the Lutheran 
religion, Swedish laws and legal system: Finnish translation (from Russian) in K. Grotenfelt (ed.), 
Suomenkielisiä historiallisia asiakirjoja Ruotsin vallan ajalta [Finnish Historical Documents from the 
Swedish Period] (Acta Historica Fennica 1912) p. 344-445. Of course it was not only constitutional laws but 
also other forms of Swedish laws such as the Swedish Law of the Realm of 1734 (1734 års lag). For a 
broader discussion on Swedish/Finnish private law, see H. Pihlajamäki, ‘Why was private law not codified in 
Sweden and Finland?’, in O. Moréteau et al. (eds.), Comparative Legal History (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2019) p. 465 (where the 1734 Law is described as ‘the jewel in the crown of Swedish statutory measures in 
the premodern era’, at p. 477). 
50 Karonen, supra n. 33, p. 429. The text of the Act says that the Emperor promised to ‘confirm and ratify’ 
the religion and the fundamental laws as well as ‘privileges and rights’ (the sovereign’s pledge was 
originally written in the language in which it was orally presented i.e. French; the quotations here are 
translated from the Swedish version). 
 
 
In any case, Finland’s outdated constitutional laws from the eighteenth century played an important 
role in this, because the Russian Tsar ‘would certainly not have tolerated more developed political 
self-governance’ than that which Finland had at that time.51 Later, Finnish legal scholars fulfilled a 
key role in defending the constitutional position of Finland as a separate state-like entity, distinct 
from the rest of Russia – a view challenged, in turn, by Russian scholars.52 Throughout the 
eighteenth century, the budding culture of early Finnish constitutionalism mixed legal, political, and 
historical views and arguments when struggling to preserve its Swedish constitutional rules. The 
existence of written constitutional rules provided a source of legal arguments against attempts by 
the Russian authorities to interpret autonomy narrowly. 
  
It may sound paradoxical but what the Tsar meant or did not mean is of less relevance here. The 
Finnish understanding of the importance of written constitutional rules, which came into being 
during the 1800s, is important for path dependence because this understanding had a formative 
significance and because it substantiated how the Swedish constitutional heritage was (internally) 
understood and upheld in the Grand Duchy. Regardless of the fact that the exact constitutional 
significance of the pledge, as the Tsar himself understood it, was not clear in terms of this 
constitutional heritage, it was nevertheless important for constitutional path dependence.53 The 
significance of the constitutional documents of 1772 and 1789 became decisive partially because 
for decades the Tsar did not call the Diet to convene. Indeed, it was only in 1863 that the Diet was 
called to meet by Alexander II (ruled 1855-1881), then regularly from 1876, because new 
legislation required the approval of the Diet according to the Grand Duchy’s constitutional laws. In 
other words, it took 54 years before the next Diet was held after Porvoo. Of course, new legislation 
was de facto passed during the years between 1809 and 1863.54 The fact that legislative reforms 
were carried out mainly by imperial decree meant that the constitutional framework remained 
officially unaltered.55 This meant, furthermore, that the constitutional practice of autocratic Sweden 
                                                             
51 F. Lagerroth, Moderna författningar mot historisk bakgrund [Modern Constitutions against Historical 
Background] (Norstedts 1955) p. 192. 
52 HT Klami, The Legalists: Finnish Legal Science in the Period of Autonomy 1809-1917 (Finnish Society of 
Sciences and Letters 1981). 
53 O. Jussila, Suomen suuriruhtinaskunta [Grand Duchy of Finland] (WSOY 2004) p. 74-77. 
54 Jussila, supra n. 53, p. 232-254. 
55 In doing so, the Russian Emperor actually continued earlier Swedish practice following 1772; the Estates 
convened only on the call of the King, which meant that the King used de facto legislative power single-
handedly through administrative regulations that came into force without the consent of the Riksdag: Jyränki, 
supra n. 32, p. 76. 
 
was continued in the Grand Duchy: instead of a Swedish king, a Russian tsar was ruling by royal 
decree. The Gustavian period thus continued, albeit under a different monarchy and state structure. 
 
As such, the period during which the Diet did not convene was not unconstitutional, in the sense 
that under the Deed of Association and Security the King was entitled to call the Riksdag to 
convene and, moreover, ‘the Estates will not deal with any other matters than those proposed by the 
King’.56 In 1863, when the Diet convened for the second time after 1809 because of growing 
legislative needs, the Tsar emphasised his intention to retain the constitutional powers that were his 
under Finland’s existing fundamental laws. To that end, the Tsar accepted the transformation of the 
Diet into a regularly convening legislative body organised so that it was based on the Estates. The 
Grand Duchy of Finland’s Diet consisted of four Estates, namely nobles, clergy, burghers, and 
peasants. During its active years, the Finnish Diet passed some 400 pieces of legislation.57 The long 
inactive period between 1809 and 1863 was termed ‘state night’.58 Now that it had ended, new 
legislative activity was needed. This meant a formative lock-in-phase for the Finnish model of 
constitutionality control, a phase built directly on the existing constitutional framework provided by 
the Swedish constitutional heritage and Finland’s politically precarious position as a Grand Duchy. 
The Era of Liberal Reforms involved active legislating on matters that were needed to reform the 
economic system, such as freedom of contract and freedom of enterprise, which had not been 
neecessary under the previous mercantilism.59 
 
A key factor behind the next step in the path was the fact that the Finns were keen to keep their 
constitutional laws. In practice, the majority of Finns vigorously opposed all Russian efforts to 
bring Finland more tightly into Russia’s grip. Moreover, the idea of ‘Finland’ grew stronger, and 
there was a will to reform Finnish society according to Western European models, animated by the 
budding idea that Finland formed a separate nation within the Russian Empire. Finland had its own 
culture and language, clearly different from those of other places in the Empire. This had an effect 
on how the legacy of 1809 was conceived as the foundational act of a Finnish autonomous (de 
                                                             
56 § 6: ‘… Riksdag inga andra ämnen än dem konungen proponerar’. This section, then, directly refers to the 
constitutional law existing before the Age of Liberty by continuing that ‘as was usually the case before 1680’ 
(‘på sätt som före 1860 var vanligt’). 
57 J. Kekkonen, ‘“Golden Age of Legislation” in Finland 1863–79’, 2 Russian Law Journal (2014) p. 63. 
58 Y. Koskinen, a prominent Finnish nationalist leader of late nineteenth-century Finland, famously coined 
the long inactive period as ‘state night’ (valtioyö) or ‘stateless night’ by writing that ‘[our] state night, over a 
half-century long, had come to its end’, Suometar 17 August 1864 (Suometar was a newspaper published 
from 1847 to 1866).  
59 J. Kekkonen, ‘The Finnish Path to a State Based on the Rule of Law: from 1850 to the Present’, in K. 
Nuotio et al. (eds.), Introduction to Finnish Law and Legal Culture (Forum Iuris 2012) p. 75 at p. 76-78. 
 
facto) state with its own constitutional laws.60 The existence of Swedish constitutional documents 
was an important part of the equation, though not the only one, in which the Swedish heritage had a 
constructive capacity as a legal basis on which to build without direct Russian interference. 
 
The start of the active period of the Diet was not problem-free. Members of the Diet quickly noted 
that Swedish-period procedures included rules that were inadequate, contradictory, or even 
impossible to implement.61 The new Diet Act, accepted in 1869, was applied by the Diet until 1906. 
Because the Act was conceived merely as a technical reform of the earlier 1617 Order, it was not 
regarded as an important constitutional document.62 However, because the Diet started to convene 
from 1863 onwards, a more up-to-date collection of procedural rules for the Diet was required in 
practice.63 
 
<H1>Constitutionality control devised 
The underlying constitutional dilemma in the nineteenth century, from 1863 onwards, was how to 
ensure the constitutionality of new laws so that the constitutional heritage of 1772 and 1789 would 
stay intact in order to protect autonomy. It is important to clarify the distinction between Finnish 
and Russian doctrine because, as time passed, the further away from each other their constitutional 
views grew.64 Gradually, Finns started to think that some of the constitutional practices that were 
based on the earlier constitutional documents had gained the position of constitutional customary 
law.65 The interwoven deterrent was, however, that much of the desperately needed modern 
legislation would unavoidably stand in contradiction with constitutional norms. The normal solution 
would be to change the constitution or, alternatively, empower the courts to undertake judicial 
review, thus ensuring that laws would not contradict the constitution. The problem was that both of 
these options were undesirable and could not be fitted in the constitutional path without serious 
deviation. 
 
                                                             
60 As Jyränki, supra n. 32, p. 403 comments: ‘The continuity in legal thinking from the period of autonomy 
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61 O. Pekonen, ‘The political transfer of parliamentary concepts and practices in the European periphery: the 
case of obstruction in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Finland’, 37 Parliaments, Estates and 
Representation (2017) p. 281 at p. 282. 
62 Valtiopäiväjärjestys Ask 11/1869 [Ask is an abbreviation of Asetuskokoelma, i.e., the Official Collection of 
Enactments], the Diet Act. 
63 Jussila, supra n. 53, p. 346-347. 
64 Jyränki, supra n. 32, p. 408. 
65 Jyränki, supra n. 32, p. 403. 
 
Changing the text of old fundamental laws that Alexander I had promised to uphold in 1809 might 
risk compromising the legal basis of autonomy, leaving the door open for deeper Russification of 
the Grand Duchy. For the majority of the Finnish elite, who wanted to protect and preserve the 
constitutional foundation of autonomy, this was not something to be done lightly. For similar 
reasons, opening the door for judicial review was out of the question. This was because judicial 
power was within the reach of Russia. At that time, the domestic government and the highest 
judicial power were organised under the same roof, namely the Senate. This organ combined the 
functions of a cabinet and the highest court from 1816 until the early steps of an independent 
Finland. There were two separate divisions, the Economic Division (talousosasto) and the Judicial 
Division (oikeusosasto). Importantly, Russia chose individuals to fill positions in the Senate. In 
practice, this meant that judicial power ultimately lay in the hands of Russia. Now, to entrust 
judicial review into the hands of the Senate’s Judicial Division would have meant surrendering the 
interpretation of fundamental laws to individuals who could have been favourable to the expansion 
of Russian power at the expense of the powers of the Grand Duchy. 
 
As became clear from this complex situation, both of the seemingly obvious solutions to the 
constitutional dilemma regarding new legislation were, in practice, out of the question. In the 
Finnish view, the core essence of constitutional thinking was that the Tsar had pledged to govern 
Finland according to its existing laws and in particular constitutional laws. This essential idea was 
locked in to three key occurrences: 1772, 1789, and 1809. The path-dependent solution to the 
problem with new legislation had to be based, in a legal culture adhering generally to the idea of 
legalism, on earlier steps that limited freedom of choice if and when constitutional continuity was 
going to be preserved.66 That said, constitutional law would not necessarily have remained purely 
Gustavian. Old rules needed to be applied, and thus interpreted, in new situations. This meant, 
nevertheless, that certain fundamental features of the constitution were shaped and tuned under 
Russian pressure, yet at the same time they were based on old fundamental laws that were mixed 
                                                             
66 It is quite possible that one of the unintentional consequences of the 1772 Form of Government was a 
slowly growing idea according to which governance should be solely laid down in a written constitutional 
document. Therefore, the idea of some kind of constitutional legal positivism was taking shape in the 
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with the slowly growing political consciousness of an awakening nation.67 As a result, national 
identity and law became intertwined under the threat from the East.68 
 
A constitutional solution was pioneered in connection with the draft 1878 Military Service Act 
(Asevelvollisuuslaki). It was realised that many of the provisions of the Bill were in clear 
contradiction to the 1789 Deed that secured the privileges of the Estates. The problem was clear and 
unavoidable because the Bill had to be passed. To put it simply, how to preserve the fundamental 
law without altering its text, yet at the same time pass required legislation known to be contrary to 
those very rules that needed to be kept unaltered? Moreover, to pass new law and leave 
constitutionality to the Senate’s Judicial Division was, as explained above, inconceivable.69 In 
essence, a solution had to be devised within the Diet of the Estates in order to keep important 
constitutional interpretative power in the hands of the Finns. Critically, Russia had no direct reach 
inside the Diet, unlike the Senate. Crucially, the 1869 Diet Act provided that members of the Diet 
were not to follow any other rules in their capacity as a member; only ‘the country’s constitutional 
laws’ were to be taken into account.70  
 
A constitutionally feasible path had led to a situation in which the Finns simply had to come up 
with a solution that could put all the pieces in their correct places. This was a path-dependent 
tightrope-balancing act between legalism and political realism. What was done was technically 
simple; some articles of the legislative Bills were proclaimed to be constitutional as to their nature, 
and thus were passed under the same legislative procedure that would have been required for 
changing a constitutional document, namely support by three-quarters of the Estates. This solution 
enabled the passing of enactments contradictory to the constitution, though without changing the 
text of the constitutional documents themselves. In other words, an ingenious path-dependent 
solution was to eat the cake and yet at the same time to have the cake, namely to amend the 
constitution without changing its text. 
 
                                                             
67 Husa, supra n. 24, p. 17-19. 
68 L. Björne draws interesting parallels between Finland and Norway in his book ‘Threat from the East’, 
Hotet från öster: drag i finsk och även norsk konstitutionell historia fram till 1809/1814 (Dreyers Forlag 
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69 Husa, supra n. 24, p. 228-229. 
70 The Diet Act (1869), 7 §. ‘An Estate Representative, in his work, is not under any other rules than 
constitutional laws of the country’ (‘Valtiopäivämies ei ole tätä tointa käyttäessä muiden määräysten kuin 
maan perustuslakien alainen’). 
 
The solution that was devised also includes another important procedural peculiarity termed an 
exceptive law (poikkeuslaki). This is the result of a priori constitutionality control because these 
laws change the constitution substantively without altering the text of the constitutional document. 
Therefore, adoption of poikkeuslaki depends on a priori constitutional control and determining 
constitutionality takes place as part of the legislative process. In practice, the constitution is 
interpreted by the legislature in order to preventively remedy any detected unconstitutionality. The 
key outcome is clear. Exceptive laws are contrary to the idea of legal constitutionalism because they 
mean that the intended legislative act is conceived to be explicitly in conflict with the constitution 
and yet is passed by the legislature, even though under the same procedure that would be required to 
change the text of the constitution. What is more, exceptive laws are by-products of the 
fundamental solution to entrust the parliament (first the Diet) to take care of constitutionality 
control before parliamentary laws come into force. Now, discussing exceptive laws would require a 
paper on its own, so cannot be dealt with here in more detail.71 Nonetheless, suffice to note that the 
idea of changing constitutional laws without changing the texts of constitutional documents was 
already instilled in 1809 by the Tsar’s pledge.72 
 
The constitutional doctrine that was created is the institutional solution (one parliamentary 
committee reviews constitutionality preventively) that remains a functioning part of Finnish 
constitutional law and political constitutionalism. In the late Russian period, just before 
independence, the legislative assembly functioned as a constitutional bulwark against Russification. 
Constitutional interpretation ideology as to its nature was mostly unanimous and clear in terms of 
Finland’s legal status: constitutional laws must be interpreted extremely narrowly and in autonomy-
friendly mode.73 Much of the prestige that the Committee gained during these years was transferred 
to the budding constitutional practices of an independent country that chose not to rely on legal 
constitutionalism, instead relying on an interwoven constitutional doctrine rooted gradually in the 
constitutional system. The institutional core of this solution is to make one of the Committees of the 
Diet (later parliament) responsible for controlling the constitutionality of Bills. At first, it was the 
Diet’s Legal Affairs Committee (lakivaliokunta) and then from 1906 onwards the Constitutional 
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Law Committee to which this central constitutional function was assigned. Thus it was Finnish 
constitutional invention that kept constitutionality control as an internal affair of the Grand Duchy 
rather than a power that would have been either directly in Russian hands or, at least, under Russian 
influence.74 
 
The newly crafted control model was first used in its fully developed form in 1882 when the Seat 
Farm obligation was abolished.75 The Bill was sent to the Law Committee, which was tasked with 
issuing a statement on constitutionality (and what legislative procedure was required) to another 
Committee that was dealing with the Bill substantively. In international comparison, this 
institutional solution was and is rare: in a situation when concerns exist about the constitutionality 
of a Bill, it was sent to a specialist Committee that had to evaluate and decide exclusively on the 
constitutionality issue.76 In practice, the Finnish Diet now (from 1882 onwards) had a specialist 
Committee tasked with providing an authoritative interpretation on the constitutionality of a Bill.  
 
The new control mechanism rooted quickly as it was deemed an important means of safeguarding 
autonomy. In 1888, this practice was already described as ‘a normal procedure’. In effect, the 
function of the Committee may be rightly described as quasi-judicial.77 Rather soon, the Committee 
started to use its earlier statements as a kind of precedent. The institutionally peculiar foundational 
idea was to admit that the Law Committee’s interpretation was not necessarily the right one; 
however, it became de facto binding guidance for the Diet, so the Committee’s statement on the 
correct legislative procedure had to be taken into account. That is to say, the Estates themselves 
assumed the role of guardians of the constitution.78 In other words, Finnish constitutionalism 
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developed from the outset as political constitutionalism and developed as such during most of the 
twentieth century.79 
 
In the late nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century (1899-1905) Russia 
started to severely limit the special status of the Grand Duchy. This period was followed by a 
second period of Russification (1908-1917) that maintained similar goals regarding Finland. In 
Finnish, these periods are called collectively the Times of Oppression (sortokaudet). Eventually, 
Finnish opposition to Russification played an important role leading to the declaration of 
independence in 1917. Notably, Finnish opposition to oppression was constitutional in nature. 
Arguments were based on existing constitutional documents and customs. In practice, Finns resisted 
Russification by making legal – and ultimately legalistic – arguments when they sought to defend 
the status of the Grand Duchy.80 During the second period of Russification, the crux of the 
Committee’s work, both qualitatively and quantitatively, focused on interpreting the constitutional 
position of Finland defensively.81 As a corollary, the Constitutional Law Committee became a core 
institution, as indeed it remains to this day. 
 
Russification started with a constitutional shock move by the Tsar in 1899 with the February 
Manifesto, which limited autonomy and the former constitutional legacy. In short, the Manifesto 
was aimed at abolishing Finland’s fundamental laws.82 Nicholas II’s explicit purpose was to make 
earlier constitutional laws obsolete. The Tsar added with his own hand a marking in the margins of 
the presentation agenda of the Manifesto that ‘[I]t is time to forget the [1772] Form of 
Government’.83 According to the Manifesto’s Preamble, legislative issues concerning the general 
interests of the Empire ‘cannot be exclusively treated by the institutions of the Grand Duchy’.84 In 
the end, Russification tempered the institutional position of the Diet as a constitutional key player. 
Mounting Russian pressure impelled lawyers, historians, politicians, and ordinary people to defend 
Finnish autonomy and the constitutional basis on which it relied.85 These developments had a 
lasting impact on Finnish legal culture, which learned to place its belief in legislative procedures 
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stipulated in a detailed manner but also adding and allowing customary elements as an integral part 
of a living constitutional system.86  
 
<H1>Centrality of the Constitutional Law Committee in constitutionality control 
The most influential Finnish constitutional lawyer and professor during the twentieth century, 
Paavo Kastari (1907–91) described the Finnish solution as ‘a tactical trick with more far-reaching 
consequences than any contemporaries could have guessed. Later, developed as a systematic modus 
operandi, it became a typical feature of our constitution and a symptomatic aspect of our 
constitutional perception’.87 Even though Kastari called the Finnish solution a tactical trick, it was 
not assumed hastily. In fact, it had been doctrinally considered and was backed by theoretical 
thinking. This was demonstrated by Leo Mechelin (1839-1914), an important law professor and 
statesman. Mechelin, who was keen to defend the constitutional position of the Grand Duchy, 
developed an idea according to which one special Committee of the Diet ought to specialise in 
interpreting constitutionality in connection with Bills.88 And that, as we have seen, is precisely what 
happened in practice. 
 
Under this approach, the idea was that one of the Committees should take responsibility for giving 
‘the right’ constitutional interpretation to the whole Diet.89 Remarkably, this manner of organising 
constitutionality control today remains a distinctive feature of the Finnish constitution even though 
the system was slightly revised in the 2000 total constitutional reform.90 From the point of view of 
path dependence, it is important that the solution devised in the Diet of the Estates during the period 
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of the Grand Duchy transposed successfully to an independent Finland. Likewise, the authoritative 
status that the Law Committee had acquired during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
was transferred to the new Constitutional Law Committee.91 In other words, there were no side 
steps from the path of constitutionality control. 
 
The civil discontent and unrest that broke out in Russia following military defeat by Japan provided 
an opening for parliamentary reform in Finland in Autumn 1905. The hopelessly outdated Diet of 
the Four Estates supported a Bill calling for the establishment of a unicameral Parliament and the 
introduction of universal suffrage. Weakened because of military defeat by Japan – leading to a 
short period of quasi-constitutional monarchy – the Tsar approved the proposal and thus the Finnish 
parliament (Eduskunta) was established in 1906.92 Finland’s position as a Grand Duchy with special 
status was also confirmed in the first Russian Constitution in 1906.93 From a historical viewpoint, 
the Parliament Act of 1906 was a monumental constitutional reform:94 in short, ‘a profound break 
from the past’.95 The old Diet of the Estates was replaced by a modern unicameral Parliament; 
universal and equal suffrage was introduced. moreover,  In defiance of otherwise large-scale and 
deep-reaching reform, including abolition of the Diet and creation of a modern parliament, the 
constitutional control model did not change even though a new special Committee was established. 
The Constitutional Law Committee saw the light of day. Under the Parliament Act of 1906, this 
special Committee had to ‘prepare legislative issues that concern passing, changing, explaining or 
abolishing the constitution’.96 The existing practice was merely described and codified in the new 
constitutional document, first in 1906 and later – with slight modifications in wording – in 1928. 
Constitutionality control followed the path of continuity, unlike the 1906 reform in other ways, 
whereas 1928 was more or less a technical reform updating parliamentary procedures.97 
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97 Kastari, supra n. 85, p. 44-48. 
 
From the point of view of continuity, the new Committee continued the tradition from the previous 
century. After independence, much of the earlier constitutional practice was transferred to an 
independent Finland. This concerns not only the institutional solution and the legislative process but 
also the interpretative modus operandi, relying on academic experts and earlier statements of the 
Committee itself, which was born in the late nineteenth century. Many interpretations concerned, in 
an almost routine-like manner, property rights, and the interpretative tradition continued.98 This is 
reflected in the fact that change is minimal in the constitutional text concerning constitutionality 
control between the Parliament Acts of 1906 and 1928.99 More importantly, not only the text and 
interpretative tradition but also the accompanying constitutional thinking continued their existence 
as a part of the constitutional framework of an independent country. In a broad legal-cultural sense, 
legalism prevailed.100 At an early stage, even in the mid-1920s, the Committee assumed a key role 
in constitutional interpretation. As an illustration of its power we can register how the 1919 
Constitution did not specify – and the same applies to the Constitution in force today – the 
procedure by which exceptive laws could later be changed: as ordinary laws or as constitutional 
laws. The Constitutional Law Committee created a doctrine in the mid-1920s that remains valid 
today, even though rarely used.101 As a result, the constitutionality control system is the best-
preserved part of the constitutional culture built on a path laid down in 1772.  
 
The key question, from the viewpoint of path dependence, is why the system of constitutionality 
control was not reformed when the new Constitution – literally Form of Government – was drafted 
and passed in 1919.102 The Finns had already tried to create a new Form of Government in 1907 
under the leadership and initiative of Mechelin, but the Bill was stopped by Russia’s prime 
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minister.103 The answer to why the control mechanism remained unchanged lies in the significance 
of the constitutional path. 
 
After independence, reform of the constitutionality control mechanism would have been an option. 
However, the 1919 Form of Government did not change a system devised in the previous century 
and under very different circumstances. Nevertheless, Gustavian constitutional rules acted as a 
loose paradigm for the 1919 Constitution.104 This is the point where we can see the significance of 
path dependence. Whereas the Constitutional Law Committee had gained trust and dignity, as a key 
guardian of autonomy, the Supreme Court – the former Judicial Division of the Senate – was 
conceived as less trustworthy and less dignified as the highest institution of constitutionality 
control. In short, institutional and legal cultural continuity played an important role; it limited the 
actual space for new constitutional patterns to emerge by limiting the possibility to transfer 
constitutionality control to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the Parliament inherited the role of 
guardian of the constitution.105 
 
In 1917, discussions took place on the possibility of allowing constitutional judicial review. 
Nevertheless, little willingness was shown to giving constitutionality control to a purely judicial 
organ. Thus, propositions by politicians to establish judiciary-based constitutionality control did not 
succeed. Nevertheless, after the Civil War of 1918, some further discussion took place about giving 
full constitutional power to judicial organs.106 During the drafting of the Form of Government, 
formulations were circulating on this matter but in the end the finally accepted version did not 
change constitutionality control. All the different versions that would have allowed constitutional 
judicial review were wiped away by a Parliament that guarded its power to take care of 
constitutionality control preventively, that is, before a Bill becomes an official parliamentary Act.107 
Unsurprisingly, then, in 1919 the Parliament rejected the Supreme Court’s competence for judicial 
review by a vote of 104 to 77.108 The constitutional space left for the judicial branch in 
constitutionality control was non-existent.109  
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Yet independence brought something new to the system, especially after 1919. A novel 
constitutional custom came into being: the Constitutional Law Committee began regularly to seek 
statements from outside experts. Before 1919, there had been no need for outside expertise simply 
because many of the Committee members were public law experts. Later, it gradually became a 
constitutional custom for the Committee regularly to hear public law professors. During the 
following decades, this was to become a signature feature of constitutionality control.110 The 
practice of hearing outside experts, and giving great weight to written their statements (lausunto), is 
still a customary part of the Finnish constitution.111 Even though, no doubt, the primary source of 
constitution is a written constitutional document, the de facto significance of outside experts cannot 
be overstated.112 This path-dependent tailored constitutional custom is not - and here is the thing - 
part of a codified constitutional document.113 Historically we can note, nevertheless, that when it 
comes to the written constitution, very little is left of the text of the 1772 constitution.114 Political 
constitutionalism, on the other hand, has proved to be quite a resilient feature. Only relatively 
recently has constitutional development concerning judicial review crawled towards more active 
courts. This development has been due to European Union law, international human rights, and the 
growing domestic importance of constitutional rights.115  
 
<H1>Conclusions 
What should we think of the constitutional lock-in moments of the Finnish constitutional system? 
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Constitutional lock-in moments are distantly related to so-called constitutional moments. Ackerman 
observed the constitutional system of the United States, arguing that it has undergone a number of 
crucial transformations since it came into force in 1789.116 Yet Ackerman’s theory goes beyond the 
United States as it seeks to present a description that explains in a more general manner reasons 
behind key constitutional transformations and how they come about.117 The key difference between 
these two related notions is that lock-in moments are historical and they do not require citizens to 
act in their capacity as a sovereign people or otherwise express their momentary political 
enthusiasm.118 Of course, a lock-in moment and a constitutional moment may overlap time-wise but 
they are, nonetheless, different points of view: one underlines the idea of path in which certain 
choices limit future choices, whereas the other underlines the political deliberation of the people 
exercising their higher law-making power at certain constitutionally pivotal moments.119 Moreover, 
Ackerman’s theory is very American in its nature, and the assumptions it makes concerning the 
nature of the constitution and democracy are not directly applicable to the Finnish constitutional 
system or its history, which are very different from the American experience. 
 
Importantly, for a constitutional lock-in moment to be successful, some aspects may also depend on 
fortune. Providentially, Finland – in constitutional terms – was a backward area in 1809. That 
enabled the Russian Tsar to continue on the existing constitutional basis, also serving for 
pacification of this newly acquired region. When changing times required new legislation in the late 
nineteenth century, a novel solution was crafted to ensure constitutional continuity and legitimacy. 
By 1906, the role of the Law Committee had become that of an integral constitutional actor, which 
meant that the new Constitutional Law Committee continued on a path already laid. Independence 
and the constitutional documents of 1919 and 1928 did not change a constitutionality control 
system that was already locked in. The reform of 2000 enabled the courts to undertake judicial 
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review, but in a limited manner. The ad hoc Committee for checking the Constitution Act did not 
propose changes concerning judicial review in 2010.120 
 
The crucial path dependent-related question, however, is this: how long can Finnish 
constitutionality control exceptionalism survive in a world of ever-growing judicial expansion and 
accompanying legal constitutionalism? There is no doubt that the European and global 
constitutional environment affects the Nordic constitutions, Finland included.121 To an extent, the 
global constitutional environment affects Nordic constitutional thinking in general because it 
challenges the combination of timid judicial review, political constitutionalism, and the principal 
primacy of national Parliaments.122 However, because Finland has a specific form of 
constitutionality control, it faces pressures that are of a fundamental nature - because of the lock-in - 
in the way the system takes care of controlling the constitutionality of laws. At the end of the day, 
the challenge concerns constitutional culture and constitutionalism. Even though it is quite likely 
that judicial review will grow at the expense of the parliament, it is clear that rights-oriented legal 
constitutionalism and legislature-oriented Finnish constitutionalism are not easy to combine. The 
problem is not so much that the Constitutional Law Committee would be ill suited for rights-
oriented interpretation but rather that the Committee is becoming a gradually more politicised arena. 
In addition, the role of outside experts that is based on constitutional custom is conceived as more 
problematic, with experts accused of offering politically flavoured views on constitutional law. 
Moreover, there have been some signs of growing mistrust of the Committee among politicians.123 
 
Finally, layering is also an important mechanism in path dependence. What happens in the process 
of layering is that an institution changes incrementally because additional rules and institutional 
structures are added on top of the existing institution. Consequently, each new added layer may 
bring about a small alteration to the institution. This does not mean that the institution will not 
change, because small cumulative changes may lead to the eventual transformation of the original 
institution.124 Based on its historical path, change by incremental accumulation is probably the case 
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with the Finnish system of constitutionality control, too. It seems likely that Finland will remain a 
system that assigns a key role to non-judicial actors in upholding the constitution. 
